The International Community's Plans to deny
Haiti free and fair elections are revealed

The International Community's intentions for Haiti are revealed.

The Canadian plan for Haiti to be occupied by the international community in the way that James Foley helped fixed in Kosovo as predicted and specified by Michel Chossudovsky in an article entitled "The destabilization of Haiti at http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO402D.html ) has now been crystallized in the Canadian document copied below, written by FOCAL (Canadian Foundation for the Americas) and entitled: The Role for Canada in Post-Aristide Haiti: Structures, Options and Leadership (See, www.focal.ca).

Below is the international community's UN Mandate Structure for Haiti. The point of the Coup d'etat was to reach this idea of a "protectorate." For, it is clear if free and fair elections were help in Haiti today, Lavalas, the party that these warmongers unseated would again win. Thus, free and fair elections, or democracy in Haiti must be avoided at all cost. With the help of the Chalabis of Haiti, the tiny morally repugnant Haitian elites, Canada, who has been outsourced the U.S.'s traditional role in the Western Hemisphere with regard to Haiti due to Mr. Bush's overextension in Iraq, proposes to hold a conference, where the resolutions for this "protectorate" among other pronouncement in contravention of Haiti's sovereignty, shall be rubber stamped by its Haitian proxies.

Again Haitians of the Diaspora state categorically that neither Canada, France, the UN nor the United States have the legal right, moral or any competence whatsoever to substitute an elected government in Haiti with dictatorship or colonial rule. Only free and fair elections in Haiti shall lead to good governance, stability and security in Haiti.

While all these Internationals are supposedly in Iraq replacing dictatorship with democracy, the document below from Canada formally notes how the U.S./France and Canada along with their selected Haitian stooges are attempting to permanently replace Haiti's democracy with dictatorship.

The integrity and sovereign right of the Haitian people for self-rule shall not be sold. The only solutions to the overthrow of Haiti's elected government is 1) its return and for free and fair elections to be held, 2) for the international community to stop turning a blind eye, or worst participating in the targeted political assassinations of Lavalas supporters and for there to be a plan for the disarming of the ex-Haitian military and FRAPH paramilitary. Those are the demands of the Haitian people. A UN protectorate run by UN officials such as Gerald Latortue is as unthinkable to Haitians as the Coup d'etat that first brought the UN occupying troops and its "interim government" to Haiti.

The destabilization campaign which led to this juncture shall not find ultimate success in the complete occupation of Haiti for ten, twenty or thirty years ( See FOCAL's racists and facists neo-con musings below and in the context of Schossudovsky's article at http://globalresearch.ca/articles/CHO402D.html )

Marguerite Laurent, Esq.
Haitian Lawyers Leadership Network
December 7, 2004

The author can be reached at


The Role for Canada in Post-Aristide Haiti:
Structures, Options and Leadership

This paper has been prepared for the House of Commons Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade in response to the Committee’s request by Carlo Dade, Senior Advisor with FOCAL (Canadian Foundation for the Americas) and John W. Graham, Chair of FOCAL.

1. Summary

For the third time in 20 years the government in Haiti has collapsed once again leaving the poorest country in the hemisphere as a destabilizing influence on its neighbours, a growing narcotics and transnational crime base and a major source of apprehension to Haitian and Caribbean descendant populations in Canada. These are sources of concern for Canada both domestically and regionally.

Past attempts to improve governance and quality of life have largely failed through a
combination of Haitian truculence, corruption, donor fatigue and impatience. Continued failure will make reform more difficult as the repercussions from lawlessness and poverty increasingly impact the region.

The situation in Haiti is dire but not yet at the level of concern as in Afghanistan, Iraq or Somalia, though Haiti clearly is heading in that direction. The challenge is to learn from past mistakes at State building in Haiti and elsewhere to find a development model that will work. Without a forceful and committed advocate from the developed world, discussions at the UN, the OAS, and CARICOM will continue to lack urgency and focus and Haiti will again slip from the forefront of international conscience. Canada has a unique combination of national interest and comparative advantage to work in Haiti.

Given its commitments elsewhere, the United States appears reluctant take on long-term leadership. Canada remains the only country in the hemisphere with the appropriate experience and qualifications. This is an opportunity for Canada to assert the leadership, which the Prime Minister is seeking, complement multilateral measures that Canada already has supported and raise Canada's hemispheric profile.

This paper offers a brief analysis, outlines a plan of action and concludes with discussion of the exit strategy.

2. Background and Legal Authority

In Haiti, institutions that support law and order and exercise the functions of government have broken down under internal violence and economic collapse. The remnants of a 2/6 Haitian State persist as a shadow presence; it retains a flimsy legal standing but, for all practical purposes, has lost the ability to exercise authority in its own territory. Haiti has become a 'failed state'. States which lack control over their territory and which cannot guarantee law and order
threaten international peace by serving as a base for crime, public health threats, refugee crisis and regional unrest. Such States also harm the basic human rights of their own citizens. Failed States have thus become subject to intervention by the international community through actions most often initiated and carried out by the U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.

Haiti clearly meets the definition of a failed State and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1529 of February 2004 on Haiti grants authority both for a peacekeeping intervention (Section 2: "Authorizes the immediate deployment of a Multinational Interim Force..." and Section 3: "Declares its readiness to establish a follow-on U.N. stabilization force...") as well as a longer-term intervention (Section 10. "Calls upon the international community, in particular the U.N., the OAS and CARICOM to work with the people of Haiti in a long-term effort to promote the rebuilding of democratic institutions and to assist in the development of a strategy to promote social and economic development and to combat poverty.")

3. Situation in Haiti

While conditions in Haiti are neither as dire nor dangerous as in Afghanistan or Iraq, the vacuum of governance and the scale of appalling human misery is a reproach to the hemisphere and to the principal donor nations. Haiti is in the bottom tier of the UN Human Development Index. Ranked 150 out of 175 countries surveyed it sits below countries such as Sudan and Bangladesh. The next closest country in the Americas is Nicaragua, which is ranked at 121. It is estimated that one of every twelve Haitians has contracted HIV/AIDS and a ten year forecast sets the number of orphaned children at approximately 350,000. Transnational crime is a grave issues. Haiti is a major drug transhipment point. A U.S. DEA spokesman estimates that close to 21 per cent of cocaine leaving Colombia for the US and Canada passes through Haiti. Guy Phillipe, one of the leaders of the insurgency, has been under investigation by US Drug Enforcement Agencies. Money from the drug trade fuels lawlessness, weakens governance and increases instability. Without a competent functioning government in Haiti these problems, and their impacts on Canada and the region, will become more severe.

Given the chaos of the last several months all of these statistics are worsening. Haiti has not been neglected by donor agencies, humanitarian assistance has continued to flow, but the country is a notorious sinkhole for foreign aid. A recent World Bank study indicated that 15 years of development assistance have produced "no noticeable effect".

It is not the purpose of this paper to determine to what extent this situation is selfinflicted.

Without question, governance has been incompetent, corrupt and frequently
brutal over the 200 years of independence and these adjectives can all be applied to the government of Jean Bertrand Aristide.In fairness it should be recalled the birth of a black republic was not welcomed by the international community of the time. Soon after independence in 1804, Haitians were compelled to pay crippling 'reparations' to France. A slave owning United States imposed a trade embargo that remained in some form for almost a hundred years.

Frustration with Haitian performance, followed by international censure and punishment, was the pattern for the next hundred years. Withholding aid to leverage reform has failed - invariably reversing the little progress achieved during periods of international support.

4. Rebuilding Haiti

The old models for the rehabilitation of Haiti have failed. This paper recommends that a new model should be examined. In our view its major components should be:
Long-term commitment. The UN Secretary General has called for a commitment of ten years. This is emerging as the minimum commitment subscribed to by principal
international and bilateral donors based on examination of the most recent State building exercise in Haiti and lessons learned from Kosovo and East Timor. Canada should support this consensus.

Support not control. Most State building as well as traditional development programmes now stress the importance of local 'ownership'. For example, 'Afghan solutions for Afghan problems' was a mantra of the preparations for Afghanistan's reconstruction. But, Development is notoriously supply- rather than demand-driven process as some donors seek to advance national interest, including pushing pet causes carried out by favoured NGOs. Canada is in a strong position to advocate a more rational developmental approach and stress the prioritization of the development of Haitian institutional capacity.

Trust fund and donor support. Donors should be encouraged to pool funds needed to
support an interim Haitian government into a trust fund managed either by an
international organization or a private firm. A board including Haitian, UN and major
donor members would oversee the fund and sign off on disbursements. Such a fund
would encourage fiscal responsibility on the part of the new regime and offer incentive for the more rapid development of institutional capacity in government ministries. Also, evidence from Afghanistan and elsewhere shows that donors actually disburse only about 60 per cent of promised aid. A trust fund would help with planning in Haiti.

Sustained commitment and leadership. It is well known from experience with Haiti
and elsewhere that commitment erodes and funding declines as the crisis that first
precipitated international engagement fades from media attention. This situation has been avoided only when a major donor nation has taken on the responsibility to lead and sustain the initiative, as did Australia in East Timor and Norway in Sri Lanka.

This is not something that the United Nations has proven able to do by itself. The US will be the main donor, but with other more pressing responsibilities and a troubled history in Haiti, it appears to be actively seeking another nation to assume leadership on Haiti. Canada is a natural candidate. Brazil already has committed troops to the planned long-term UN peacekeeping force. But , it is unlikely that Brazil would be able to offer the political leadership to guide UN intervention. Again, Canada has the credentials.

Security. No progress on any front is possible without the restoration and maintenance of security and the rule of law. The first step to restoring order and the rule of law is to move to arrest the leaders of the armed insurgency, for whom criminal charges are already outstanding. Foreign military and police units should remain until they can be gradually replaced by adequately trained local constabulary. Recalling frustrated Canadian experience in the nineties, equal attention must be given to the parallel establishment of a reasonably reliable judicial and penal system. While Brazil will assume primary peacekeeping duties, Canada could take the lead in providing long-term support to the rebuilding of the police and justice system.

International and Multilateral Support. Discussions in Washington indicate plans for a
tripartite UN/OAS/CARICOM international framework. The World Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank, the US, Canada, France and the EU should be invited to subscribe to sustained funding over a ten-year period. Canada should continue to take the lead at the UN and other international bodies in promoting wider support for the effort in Haiti. CIDA is already addressing the issue of Hispaniola wide (including the Dominican Republic) planning on environmental and cross border issues.

Bosnia/Dayton, E Timor, Cambodian political models. The present interim
government in Haiti is non-elected, exercises almost no control over the territory, lacks popular support and its legitimacy is questioned in Haiti and the region. Discussions on re-establishing the State in Haiti should reflect a new model including agreement between the international community (OAS/UN/CARICOM) and the interim government to delegate authority for a limited period for limited purposes to develop security and the judiciary, to supervise the distribution of aid, to support municipal governance and, rehabilitate essential services including health. The agreement should include a timetable for the devolution of authority and control to Haitians and supervising bodies should increasingly include Haitian participation. The agreement should flow from UN Security Council Resolution 1529.

Elections. The 'model' should include approximate parameters for an electoral calendar.

Given the chaotic political landscape, the error of a rush to elections in Bosnia must be avoided. First elections should be at the municipal level.

The Haitian Diaspora. Due to out-migration and flight, there is an acute shortage of
competent professionals in every vital category throughout government ministries and civil society organizations. Joint and independent CIDA and USAID efforts are underway to incorporate the Haitian Diaspora in the rebuilding process. Canada has long-standing experience in this area and should continue to promote efforts to recruit qualified members of the Haitian diaspora.

Urgency. With the crisis beginning to lose attention in Canada and elsewhere, it is
essential to move rapidly to obtain a commitment to a new model and long-term support.

For example, CIDA and the
Provincial Ministry of Education
in Quebec could agree on a plan
for working with the Ministry of
Education in Haiti and would
draft a budget and assign a project
leader, ideally a Haitian-Canadian
who would be seconded from the
Ministry in Quebec. This person
could serve as deputy minister but
would report to the UN Special
Representative. In reviewing the
needs of the Education sector in
Haiti CIDA could decide that an
intensive intervention would be
needed for five years to bring the
Ministry of Education to a point
where it could work directly with
international donors and manage
the ministry. The relationship with
the Ministry of Education of
Quebec ideally would continue
either formally or informally past
this five-year period.

International experience has demonstrated that the concept of the 'ripeness' of
circumstances is crucial to achieving agreements that are tough enough to be viable.

International players have a short attention span.

5. Structure for Rebuilding.

In recent State building interventions, authority has typically flowed from the Security Council to the Secretary General, who appoints a Special Representative and a force commander. The Special Representative is responsible to the Secretary General for all aspects of the intervention as defined in the Security Council resolution. The force commander is responsible for the military effort and may also have "command and control" of the national military contingents deployed to support the mandate. In some cases command and responsibility for executing the mission can flow from the Security Council to a U.N. member state or other organization, such as NATO.

This model should continue in Haiti where, the U.N. already has assigned both a Special Advisor for Haiti and a force commander for a three-month period with stipulations that longer-term arrangements be negotiated at the end of this time.

The U.N. resolution also calls for the participation of the OAS and CARICOM.

6. Exit Strategy

A key factor in designing the structure and mechanisms is to plan for the graduation of the Haitian State to independence and a return to the international community.

This should be sequenced on a ministry-by-ministry basis - in other words
return to full Haitian authority would depend not on a fixed date for all
ministries, but on case-by-case basis of the institutional maturity of
each ministry. The end of the UN Special Representative's tenure
would signal the formal end of the State building process.

Engagements with the line ministries could end earlier or later. In
essence, the Donor's Group would divide/assign responsibility and
funding for each ministry. The oversight and coordination for this
work would be done by the UN Special Representative

The primary goal would be to identify agencies in donor countries that
have significant resources, and especially those involving the Haitian
Diaspora, that could be seconded to work in Haiti to jump-start the
rebuilding process. The secondary goal in doing this is to build donor
confidence and attract the resources needed for reconstruction. The
third goal is to establish long-term relationships that could allow for
continued, sometimes informal, transfers of knowledge and skills.
Under the UN programme, peacekeepers should remain for one to
three years while police would remain for up to 10 years. An initial
force of two to three thousand peacekeepers would be needed to
provide overwhelming force to disarm gangs and restore the rule of
law. Once this is accomplished the force could be reduced to 500
police advisors and trainers who would support the Haitian police.Peacekeeping requirements will be lighter in Haiti than in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Iraq
because the country lacks cadres of seasoned, trained, well-armed fighters. Given time and improved narco-connections, armed gangs in Haiti could develop into formidable gang bosses or warlords along the Jamaican and Somali models. But organized Haitian gangs have not yet reached this stage and one goal of this intervention is to prevent that scenario from emerging. For peacekeeping to be effective the international community must move decisively now to
disarm the population and then re-establish the police and

The key to successful disarmament is tying it to reconstruction in the popular view. Those who hold weapons must be portrayed by the international community, and must be understood by Haitians, to be impediments to the resumption of aid,
rebuilding of the country and the creation of jobs.

Forwarded by the Haitian Lawyers Leadership
"Men anpil chay pa lou" is Kreyol for - "Many hands make light a heavy load."
See, The Haitian Leadership Networks' 7 "Men Anpil Chay Pa Lou" campaigns to help restore Haiti's independence, the will of the mass electorate and the rule of law. See, http://www.margueritelaurent.com/campaigns/campaigns.html
and http://www.margueritelaurent.com/law/lawpress.html .
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Denounce Canada's role in Haiti: Canadian officials Contact Infomation

Urge the Caribbean Community to stand firm in not recognizing the illegal Latortue regime:

Selected CARICOM Contacts
zilibutton Slide Show at the July 27, 2004 Haiti Forum Press Conference during the DNC in Boston honoring those who stand firm for Haiti and democracy; those who tell the truth about Haiti; Presenting the Haiti Resolution, and; remembering Haiti's revolutionary legacy in 2004 and all those who have lost life or liberty fighting against the Feb. 29, 2004 Coup d'etat and its consequences
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